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The Real Story of Sino-Indian War, 1962
By
A.K. Dave IP (Retd.)
 

1 India did not attack China, nor did it really provoke China China's war on India was China's own decision The Indian people should have no reason to feel guilty of provocation and should shed this complex.
2 India's misnamed "Forward Policy' was not a cause
for China to wage war on India. But for it, India's case for its territories in Ladakh and NEFA would have been greatly weakened.
3 The war was initiated by the invasion of territory on
Sept.8 with a large force in the Namkhachu valley and pouring in of Chinese reinforcements in continuation thereof. They had 2 Bns by mid-September.
4 Oct 19/20 is the date on which the Chinese extending
the war attacked all along the frontier.
5 The immediate decision to "throw out the intruders"
was based on unambiguous advice from the Dy CGS without any prompting. Subsequent advice for caution by the COAS was disregarded by the Foreign Secretary on his superficial interpretation of the PM's view.
6 In the early months of 1962, according to a reliable IB
report, China was apprehending an attack from Taiwan and S.Korea from the east and was greatly concerned about its defense capacity if there was a simultaneous attack from India with US assistance. Gen. Liu Bocheng projected such an attack and had begun inducting forces and supplies from
February into Tibet. Authorisation to prepare to "counterattack' India was given in Max by Mao and for 3 Theatre Commands to be created.
7 In June, the USA informed China that there would be
no attack from Taiwan/S.Korea. That apparently decided Chinese leaders to force a decision on border alignment with India, by war if necessary, in order to avoid future possibility of being required to fight on two fronts.
8 On June 8. IB informed Govt of India of China's decision towage war in September if border issue was not settled.
8a Analysis and assessment of intelligence is not enough. Its assimilation by relevant government authorities, decision makers and implementers is essential.
8b A system for verification that preparations for defense and security are actually provided for and in place and are adequate. Inadequacies can thus be spotted and rectified.
9 The Dhola Post set up on June 4 was not the provocation for the Chinese war for which preparations had been made by China from May.
10 China did not launch the war to take advantage of the
USSR-USA confrontation in the Caribbean which was disclosed only on Oct 22.
11 The Soviet Union cleverly equivocated to deny support
to fraternal China and soon came out in support of friend India.
12 China's war on India was not an extension of the
Soviet-China dispute but only a minor factor. China waged the war for its own strategic and national reasons and to replace or weaken and humiliate Nehru and his government.
13 The second renewed offensive by China on Nov. 17
was to take on the Indian Army squarely and defeat it so as to establish the PLA's superiority and to teach India to beware and also to complete its capture of all the remaining areas in Ladakh that it claimed.
14 Nehru's firm refusal to accept a cease-fire on Oct.24
and again on Nov. 22 was an affirmation that India was not prepared to concede victory but would be preparing itself to fight when it had got itself ready.
15 There was lack of preparedness by the Indian civil and
military machine for war despite warnings given. The PM alone cannot be blamed for the shortcomings.
16 It was strange that India did not think of a counter
offensive on Chumbi valley. It also deliberately decided not to use the IAF.
17 Despite shortage of stores, equipment and supplies and
suitable road heads, the Indian contingents fought bravely in Ladakh and even in NEFA except for the confusion in command in Kameng F.D. Their bravery and courage in fighting to the last man and last round deserve to be publicly acknowledged. The undeclared war was not fought to a finish.
18 India realised too late that it required allies to help it in
a war crisis.
19 The political leaders of all parties were not taken into
confidence and a united front created at least after Oct. 1959.
20 Foreign policy should inevitably be rooted in real-
politic and the country and all arms of the government have to be ever ready to project and defend the real-politic alone or in alliance.
Note : For going through full article above, Mr. A.K. Dave should be contacted.

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Last modified: January 20, 2004